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I. INTRODUCTION
Automatic test-case generation techniques of symbolic ex-
ecution and fuzzing are the most widely used methods to
discover vulnerabilities in, both, academia and industry. How-
ever, both these methods suffer from fundamental drawbacks
that stop them from achieving high path coverage that may,
consequently, lead to discovering vulnerabilities at the numer-
ical scale of static analysis. In this presentation, we examine
systems-under-test (SUTs) at the granularity level of functions
and postulate that achieving higher function coverage (exe-
cution of functions in a program at least once) than, both,
symbolic execution and fuzzing may be a necessary condition
for discovering more vulnerabilities than both.
We will start this presentation with the design of a targeted
search strategy for KLEE, sonar-search, that prioritizes paths
leading to a target function, rather than maximizing overall
path coverage in the program. Then, we will show that exam-
ining SUTs at the level of functions (compositional analysis
[6]) leads to discovering more vulnerabilities than symbolic
execution from a single entry point. Using this finding, we
will, then, demonstrate a greybox fuzzing method [7] that
can achieve higher function coverage than symbolic execution.
Finally, we will present a framework to effectively manage
vulnerabilities and assess their severities [3].
II. SONAR-SEARCH STRATEGY
We implemented a targeted search strategy in KLEE to
reach entry points of arbitrary functions. Since the original
implementation of KLEE does not provide such a targeted
strategy, we extended it with sonar-search in KLEE22 [2],
our fork of KLEE. We drew inspiration from past works such
as [8, 4] and adapted them so that we may use LLVM control-
flow-graph and call-graph to calculate node distances, instead
of relying solely on the source code.
Sonar-search works in the following way – for ev-
ery state that can be reached by the symbolic execu-
tor, the searcher tracks the minimum number of steps,
minFutureDistance, that this state is yet to take to reach
the target function’s entry point. Then, for every new state
during symbolic execution, there may be three possible values
for minFutureDistance
1) If the target entry point cannot be reached, then the value
is ∞.
2) If the target entry point can be reached, then the value is
the maximum of
a) the number of direct steps (without tracking back in
the program stack) to the target entry point, and
b) minFutureDistance of its direct ancestor in the
program stack plus the minimum steps till return
statement, so as to reach the direct ancestor.
Naturally, then, all the execution states that can never reach
the target entry point (minFutureDistance = ∞) are
removed from the queue of the states to be explored.
Finally, so as to not stop exploring more paths in the
program, KLEE22 switches to KLEE’s default search strategy
for all states that follow the target function’s entry point.
III. COMPOSITIONAL SYMBOLIC EXECUTION WITH
MACKE
Sonar-search strategy is a building block of Macke [6], our
compositional analysis tool that employs parallel and targeted
symbolic execution. The goal of compositional analysis is to
find more vulnerabilities than forward symbolic execution,
while, at the same time, keeping the number of false-positives
less than static analysis.
Macke starts by isolating functions to prepare them for
parallel symbolic execution. All functions get individual entry-
points at the LLVM level, by analyzing the number and types
of formal arguments (primitive datatype or single pointers
only). After the functions are isolated, Macke symbolically
executes every function for a short amount of time. This step
leads to higher path coverage than KLEE for functions lying
low in the control-flow-graph of a program, for the simple
reason that Macke removes the guard conditions (constraints)
to trigger the functions. As a result, Macke can find more
vulnerabilities in the program than KLEE.
However, the vulnerabilities found by Macke in isolated
functions may not be “real” vulnerabilities if there is no
opportunity to exploit them using a usable entry-point to the
program. To estimate the impact of the discovered vulner-
abilities, Macke performs compositional symbolic execution
by pruning those paths from higher level functions that do
not lead to discovered vulnerabilities. Sonar-search is the
strategy of choice for this path-pruning exercise. Macke, in this
step, replaces function bodies (using LLVM Opt) by simple
assertions that compare incoming function parameters with
exploits generated by KLEE22 for isolated functions. Then,
Macke uses sonar-search strategy, with vulnerable functions
as targets, to confirm whether those vulnerabilities can be
exploited from higher level functions.
Our evaluation results on 15 open-source programs, in [6]
and another unpublished study, show that there is an increase
in instruction coverage with Macke, as compared to KLEE,
trivially due to adding multiple entry-points. Additionally,
we were able to generate 108 exploits for vulnerabilities in
different versions of these 15 programs, that could be triggered
by the main function. KLEE could reproduce only 41 of the
same exploits.
IV. GREYBOX FUZZING WITH MUNCH
Now that we’ve shown that isolating functions can lead to
discovering more vulnerabilities, we will present a method
to increase function coverage without deliberating symbolic
execution at multiple entry points.
The second use of sonar-search that we will highlight in this
presentation is in the design of Munch [7], our framework
for hybrid fuzzing and symbolic execution. Munch tries to
maximize function coverage in C programs by adaptively
switching between fuzzing and symbolic execution whenever
one technique saturates in terms of function coverage. The
motivation behind development of this tool was an observation
that while symbolic execution is good at covering nodes of
call-graph closer to the entry point of a program, coverage
is, unfortunately, low for deeper lying functions. The reason
for this may be path-explosion in the early sections of the
programs or large constraints systems before calling deep-
lying parsing functions. Fuzzing, on the other hand, while
better at in-depth function coverage, is not as potent as
symbolic execution in diversifying function coverage in the
shallow regions of the call-graph.
Munch is an adaptive tool that operates in two modes of
operations – FS (Fuzzing+Symbolic execution, in that order)
and SF (Symbolic execution+Fuzzing, in that order). In FS
mode, the program is fuzzed (with AFL [1]) for a fixed amount
of time. Then, the program is symbolically executed with
sonar-search to target the functions that were not covered by
the fuzzer. SF mode starts with symbolic execution (KLEE
default strategy – not sonar-search) and is followed by fuzzing
with seed inputs that are generated by symbolic execution.
Our evaluation results [7] on 9 open-source programs show
that Munch performs better than symbolic execution or fuzzing
alone, both, in terms of overall function coverage and function
coverage at different depths of a program’s call-graph.
V. SEVERITY ASSESSMENT WITH COMPOSITIONAL
ANALYSIS
Having discussed methods to find more vulnerabilities with
increased function coverage we now turn our attention to false-
positives and how to mitigate them, empirically.
We used sonar-search for severity assessment of vulner-
abilities discovered using Macke and Munch. Essentially,
this is a helper technique to increase the effectiveness of
any compositional or hybrid technique involving symbolic
execution. Severity assessment using compositional analysis
was first introduced in [6] as an additional step but was
further developed and improved by us. In the current state
of our assessment framework, we predicted CVSS3 base
score values [5] for vulnerabilities discovered using Macke
and Munch. For training our prediction model, we collected
several existing vulnerabilities from the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) along with their CVSS3 scores. For all
these vulnerabilities, we collected the affected versions of
respective programs to analyze them using Macke. After
analyzing them with Macke, we calculated certain heuristics
(impact factors) for the affected functions that contain the
discovered vulnerabilities. In addition to other graph-based
impact factors (e.g. function centrality, distance to program
entry point etc.) we also included impact factors such as
“length of longest error chain”, which represents the number
of interacting functions for which the same vulnerability (root
cause) is exposed. A large value for such a chain may point
to an inadvertent programming or oversight error, leading to
a vulnerability. Using the ground truth and the corresponding
impact factors, we were able to predict CVSS3 base score
values for vulnerabilities that did not exist in NVD.
Fortunately, we were able to reproduce all existing vulner-
abilities in the NVD database with Macke. We evaluated the
effectiveness of the severity assessment tool [3] by presenting
the results of 21 programs to experts and graduate students in
the field of secure software engineering. The feedback about
was largely positive, except for a few vulnerabilities which
were harder for the experts to assess manually.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this presentation, we aim to present the technical details
of sonar-search, our targeted path-search implementation in
KLEE, an equivalent of which did not exist in the erstwhile
state-of-the-art. With three use-cases for targeted symbolic ex-
ecution, we will, then, show the effectiveness of sonar-search
in the context of compositional symbolic execution, greybox
fuzzing and severity assessment of discovered vulnerabilities.
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